Shannon Duncan

Shannon Duncan
  • Doctoral Student

Contact Information

  • office Address:

    726.4 Jon M. Huntsman Hall
    3730 Walnut Street
    University of Pennsylvania
    Philadelphia, PA 19104

Overview

Shannon Duncan is a Phd Candidate in the Wharton Marketing Doctoral Program. Shannon received her BA in Psychology from Marist College, and her MS in Neuroscience from Columbia University. She served as the Associate Director of the Center for Decisions Sciences at Columbia University.

Please visit Shannon’s personal webpage for more information: www.shannonmduncan.com.

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Research

  • Benedict G. C. Dellaert, Eric J Johnson, Shannon Duncan, Tom Baker (2024), Choice Architecture for Healthier Insurance Decisions: Ordering and Partitioning Together Can Improve Consumer Choice, Journal of Marketing, 88 (1), pp. 15-30. https://doi.org/10.1177/00222429221119086

    Abstract: Making good health insurance decisions is important for health outcomes and longevity, but consumers’ errors are well documented. The authors examine whether targeted choice architecture interventions can reduce these mistakes. The article examines the interaction of two choice architecture tools on improved consumer insurance decisions in online health care exchanges: (1) ordering the options from best to worst based on a high-quality user model and (2) partitioning the total set of options. Although ordering and partitioning do not always improve choices separately, the authors use one field study and three experiments to identify the conditions that allow the combination to greatly improve health insurance decisions. Findings indicate that when options are ordered such that the best options appear at the beginning of the presented list, partitioning nudges consumers to focus on the best options. However, if the best options are not at the top of the list, partitioning discourages search and can impair consumers’ discovery of the best options. Process data show that these effects are achieved by focusing consumers’ limited attention on higher-quality options. These results suggest that wise choice architecture interventions need to consider the joint effect of choice architecture tools as well as the quality of the firm's user model.

  • Renato Frey, Shannon Duncan, Elke U. Weber (2022), Towards a typology of risk preference: Four risk profiles describe two thirds of individuals in a large sample of the U.S. population, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 66, pp. 1-17.

    Abstract: It has been a longstanding goal of the behavioral sciences to measure and model people’s risk preferences. In this article, we adopt a novel theoretical perspective of doing so and test to what extent specific types of individuals share similar risk profiles (i.e., configurations of multidimensional risk preferences). To this end, we analyzed data of a U.S. sample (N = 3,123) in a comprehensive and rigorous way, resulting in a twofold contribution. First, based on data from the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale (DOSPERT) and using a cross-validation procedure, we established a multidimensional trait space including general and domain-specific dimensions of risk preference. Second, we employed model-based cluster analyses in this multidimensional trait space, finding that 66% of participants can be described well with four basic risk profiles. In sum, the typological perspective proposed in this article has important implications for current theories of risk preference and the measurement of individual differences therein.

  • Emma E. Levine and Shannon Duncan (2022), Deception and the marketplace of ideas, Consumer Psychology Review, 5 (1), pp. 33-50. https://doi.org/10.1002/arcp.1076

    Abstract: American democracy is built, in part, on the ideal of a “free marketplace of ideas.” Consumers are assumed to have access to the same arguments, and through deliberation, come to a consensus about which arguments are true, and therefore, best. In this article, we explain how deceptive communication undermines this ideal. We focus on two key dimensions—the motive of deception and the perception of dishonesty—that influence people's propensity to deceive and the social rewards of doing so. Deception is seen as the most justified when it is morally motivated and when it involves indirect tactics that are not perceived as particularly dishonest. We argue, therefore, that morally motivated half-truths, rather than blatantly selfish lies, may do the greatest damage to the marketplace of ideas. Ultimately, this article advances our understanding of the causes and consequences of deception and helps to explain the dynamics that lead to widespread misinformation in our social world.

  • Jon M. Jachimowicz, Shannon Duncan, Elke U. Weber, Eric J Johnson (2019), When and why defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects, Behavioural Public Policy, 3 (2), pp. 159-186. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2018.43

    Abstract: When people make decisions with a pre-selected choice option – a ‘default’ – they are more likely to select that option. Because defaults are easy to implement, they constitute one of the most widely employed tools in the choice architecture toolbox. However, to decide when defaults should be used instead of other choice architecture tools, policy-makers must know how effective defaults are and when and why their effectiveness varies. To answer these questions, we conduct a literature search and meta-analysis of the 58 default studies (pooled n = 73,675) that fit our criteria. While our analysis reveals a considerable influence of defaults (d = 0.68, 95% confidence interval = 0.53–0.83), we also discover substantial variation: the majority of default studies find positive effects, but several do not find a significant effect, and two even demonstrate negative effects. To explain this variability, we draw on existing theoretical frameworks to examine the drivers of disparity in effectiveness. Our analysis reveals two factors that partially account for the variability in defaults’ effectiveness. First, we find that defaults in consumer domains are more effective and in environmental domains are less effective. Second, we find that defaults are more effective when they operate through endorsement (defaults that are seen as conveying what the choice architect thinks the decision-maker should do) or endowment (defaults that are seen as reflecting the status quo). We end with a discussion of possible directions for a future research program on defaults, including potential additional moderators, and implications for policy-makers interested in the implementation and evaluation of defaults.